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Barkley Rosser) 
David Colander 
  The history of thought is a set of patterns that we superimpose on the 
development of ideas and theories from our current perspective. History is much like a 
magic eye picture: Change one’s perspective and one changes what seems important in 
history. Thus, our account of the history of economics tells us about ourselves and our 
current views, as well as about what previously transpired.  
  Since all patterns do not fit equally well, the pattern view of history does not 
mean that anything goes; some histories fit the pattern of events better than others. But, 
inevitably, fitting the pieces of an historical pattern together into a composite whole 
requires forceful and fast writing on the part of the author, and some gullibility on the 
part of the reader. What this means is that there will often be three or four lenses that can 
reasonably be used to look at the history of economics to convey quite different patterns. 
That is certainly the case for economics. 
Most histories of economic thought, mine included (Landreth and Colander, 
2002) are written from the perspective of developments in general equilibrium theory 
being the pinnacle of development. This paper takes a different tack, thus providing an 
example of this pattern view of history; it considers the history of economic thought from 
a different perspective than do most contemporary histories of economic thought. 
Specifically it highlights the contribution of various economists and schools of thought as 
seen from a complexity view of economics.  
  I begin by explaining what I mean by a complexity view of economics, and how it 
differs from what might be called the simplicity view of economics. Then, I discuss the 
pattern way of looking at history, briefly summarizing the story told in the standard 
history of thought texts. Having done that I sketch out, in broad outlines, some of the 
changes that I believe occur in the history of economic thought when one's underlying 
vision of economics changes from a “structural simplicity” vision to a “complexity” 
vision.1 In doing so it briefly considers whether major economists' ratings would rise or 
fall as our perspective changes. It also briefly discusses two economists who generally do 
not show up prominently in current history of thought texts, but who would show up 
prominently in one written from a complexity vision. 
Alternative Visions of Economics:  
                                                 
* This paper is adapted from Colander, 2000. For additional discussion of the issues see that book.  
1 Having spent much of my time during the last 20 years writing textbooks, I have learned the importance 
of simplifications, and have also learned the enormous injustice such simplifications do to the various 
writers. The ideas of the writers discussed in this paper, and the history of economics it conveys, are much 
more complex than this paper suggests. Complexity and the History of Economic Thought 
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  All economists know the economy is complex—very complex. That is one of the 
reasons why society needs economists—to try to make that complexity somewhat simpler 
and more understandable. In that endeavor conventional economics has seen itself as a 
conventional science; it takes complexity and simplifies it by finding a formal structural 
analytic model—an equation, or set of equations—that fits the data. The model is then 
tested by comparing the predictions of the model with the empirical data, using formal 
statistical techniques. These models are generally linear and static, since they are only 
ones with unique, deterministic solutions. To test the models classical statistical tests are 
generally used.  
  To believe that such a model exists before it has been discovered and tested 
requires a leap of faith; science, at the edge, is necessarily a combination of art and 
religion. It requires dedicated researchers who are operating on faith until sufficient 
empirical verification can be achieved so that we will tentatively accept that our 
understanding embodied in the model has gone beyond faith, and become what we call 
fact. In many areas, that faith has been borne out; conventional science has numerous 
successes. In other areas it has been less successful.  
  Formal models do not develop from a void. The beginnings of science in all areas 
involve developing informal insights into how some aspect of reality operates. Scientists 
then begin work on simplifying those informal insights into formal models. All science 
works on such simplification: The questions in such a simplification process are how to 
simplify, and whether the simplifications lose important elements of the informal 
knowledge; they are not about whether to attempt to simplify.  
  Since formal analytic models compress the data more efficiently than informal 
models, formal models are preferable as long as they do not lose insights of the informal 
models which led to them, and which allowed a broader set of explanatory variables and 
more of a sense of the importance of faith. In most areas where individuals think science 
has been successful, there has been a general belief that the formal models do not lose 
insights of the informal model. Where that belief is not generally shared, there is more 
debate about how successful science has been. 
Complexity: Extending the Boundaries of Science 
  The conventional view of science has been that if one decides that formal 
structural models lose more insights than they gain, one has decided that science is not 
relevant to that area. For example, we have no science of love; we rely on our informal 
understanding. Recently, however, a group of scientists, whom I call complexity 
scientists, have questioned whether that conventional structural simplification process is 
the best way of understanding highly complex phenomena. They have suggested that 
such phenomena might best be approached from an alternative perspective. In doing so 
they have added a new way in which science might approach complex phenomena.  
  A number of points should be emphasized about this complexity approach to 
science. First, those following it are committed to science; they accept structural 
simplicity whenever it can be achieved. But they argue that there are areas—highly Complexity and the History of Economic Thought 
4 
complex phenomena—where structural simplicity cannot be achieved, but where science 
may nonetheless have something to say.  
  Second, complexity scientists accept that the purpose of science is simplification. 
Where they differ from standard scientists is not in the desire for simplification, but in the 
proposed simplification process. They suggest that for complex systems, a simplification 
process centered around iterative processes, not structure, may be best. This new 
approach has come to be called the complexity approach to science. Let me give an 
example. Say you are trying to understand how ice forms. In conventional science one 
looks for laws that govern the formation of ice, and, in principle, finds a structural 
relationship explaining why a molecule changes from a liquid to a solid state. One then 
expands the analysis from the molecule to the whole. In complexity science, one looks 
for simple iterative processes that, under certain circumstances, lead to a large-scale 
transformation of water from a liquid state to a solid state.  
  A leap of faith that complexity scientists make is that they assume that all 
complex phenomena are subject to similar forces—that, as complexity increases, 
transformations take place in which large numbers of interactions all work 
simultaneously to form a pattern that would otherwise be unpredictable. What should be 
chaos is actually an ordered pattern. Thus, they study the general development of these 
patterns, and then apply the results of that general study to specific cases. 
  The study of complexity is highly mathematical and statistical. Where it differs 
from what I call conventional science is in the nature of the mathematics and statistics it 
uses. Instead of trying to find a formal analytical model, with a formal solution for these 
complex phenomena, complexity theory looks for patterns that develop when non-linear 
processes are repeated for long periods of time. The mathematics used is non-linear 
dynamics, and the models generally are open models with no unique deterministic 
solution. Many solutions are possible; which one is arrived at depends upon initial 
conditions and the path the model follows. What complexity scientists have shown is 
that, given certain dynamic relationships, certain patterns can develop, and that sudden 
changes in these patterns can occur. 
  The laws of complexity science are statistical probabilistic laws. They refer to 
large groups of actors and are not reducible to laws of individual actors. Complexity 
allows that aspects of reality can emerge from chance and the law of large numbers. Even 
though the individual components of a complex system are chaotic and indeterministic, 
and the movement of individuals within the body may appear random, the sum of the 
parts—the whole—can be deterministic. This structural determinism undermines the 
development of a deductive microfoundation of the aggregate. It means that composites 
of elements of smaller components are indecomposible, and must be treated as a separate 
entity and not as the sum of their parts. As complex systems evolve, new patterns can 
emerge, and these patterns can take on an existence and life of their own.  
  The complexity approach to science is highly controversial. Some (see especially 
Horgan 1996) argue that it is ill-defined, and far too grandiose; it is attempting to be a 
science of everything. These critics object to its attempt to extend the boundaries of 
science. Others argue that complexity science offers little new, that it is non-empirical, Complexity and the History of Economic Thought 
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and simply speculative. My view of these criticisms can be understood by classifying all 
phenomena into three types: (1) those areas for which most people believe that standard 
science sheds insight, (2) those areas where there is debate about how much insight 
standard science provides, and (3) those areas where standard science does not tread. 
  In category (1), where structural simplification has been shown to be useful, such 
as particle physics or chemistry, for me, there is no debate; these are the realms of 
standard science. In category (2), within which I classify economics and other social 
sciences, there is much less scientific agreement about the gains we have achieved from 
structural simplification; in these fields complexity is challenging the standard 
approaches to these fields, and the debate is about which simplification process is 
preferable. Since standard science and scientific methods are being used, complexity 
science is simply an alternative approach. The critics of complexity science have had 
little to say about its use in these areas, because, to say anything useful, one would have 
to compare the success of the complexity approach with the standard approach.  
  The broad criticism of the complexity approach, such as Horgan’s, deal primarily 
with the third category—the category in which complexity theory is used to analyze areas 
that conventional science does not touch. Some of the extensive claims that have been 
made for complexity science—that it will add insight into these areas—have been 
overdone and too far-reaching; the critics are probably right for these areas. Complexity 
science is a long way from unlocking the essence of the development of life. But such 
criticisms are not relevant for the application of complexity to economics since they do 
not, in any way, undermine the possibility that complexity science can be useful in 
analyzing the second category, where economics is found.  
  I have no definitive view on whether what is currently known as the complexity 
approach is going to succeed or not. I am drawn to it nonetheless because of my belief 
that, in economics, we have been unsuccessful in following a standard structural 
simplification approach. To achieve our current structural models we are assuming away 
too many important aspects of our complex economy. Whether the new work in 
complexity will eventually improve our knowledge of physical phenomena and the 
economy remains to be seen, but the vision that underlies the complexity approach seems 
strong. Regardless of whether it is successful or not, complexity provides a general 
framework within which to think about complex systems that is quite different than the 
conventional approach and is worth considering.  
Complexity Science and Economics 
  The history of economics has been a history of methodological fights—the 
famous methodenstreit is one well-known example. One of the major reasons for these 
fights is that it is not clear where economics fits in as a science; usually on one side of the 
methodological fight have been those who are arguing that the simplifications being used 
do not do justice to the field, and on the other side is a group who argue that 
simplification is absolutely necessary, even if bought at the cost of assumptions that do 
not fit reality. This fight has often been portrayed as a mathematical approach versus a 
non-mathematical historical/institutional approach, and that division has been a dividing 
line between mainstream and heterodox approaches. Complexity changes that; it is highly Complexity and the History of Economic Thought 
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mathematical, and, as I stated above, accepts the need for simplification. But it argues 
that the mathematics needed to simplify economics often involves non-linear dynamic 
models that have no deterministic solution.  
  In earlier time periods, such a statement would be equivalent to saying that there 
is no feasible mathematical approach to dealing with economics, but recently that has 
changed. Developments in computers have made it possible to deal with models that are 
far more complicated than previously could be dealt with. One can simulate, and through 
rote computer power, gain insight into models with no analytic solution. Thus computers 
and simulations are the foundation of the complexity approach. 
  The use of computers and simulations to gain insight into problems involves an 
enormous technological change in the way economists do economics. Complexity 
advocates take the position that such a change is a natural shift to new technology. For 
them those who are not moving toward solving models with computers are demonstrating 
Luddite tendencies in an attempt to protect their rents. Thus, complexity advocates find 
themselves on both sides of the fence in the standard methodological debates; they are 
agreeing with critics that standard science is lacking, but they favor moving to a new, 
even more complicated mathematics and statistics than standard economics uses, and are 
arguing that that ultimately it is mathematics that will provide the formal insights into 
institutions and history that is needed for economics to be a science.  
  Let me give an example of how complexity economics differs from standard 
economics. Say one is trying to understand an interaction between investment and 
changes in income. Standard economics would develop a simple analytically-solvable 
model—for instance, the Samuelson multiplier/accelerator model—that has a set of 
deterministic solutions, and then use that to study a variety of cases. In the complexity 
approach, one would try hundreds of variations of non-linear models, many with no 
deterministic solution, which capture the dynamic interactions and rely on the computer 
to show which model best fits the data. One would, of course, study the general 
properties of non-linear models, but whether the models have analytic solutions would 
not be a relevant choice criterion as it is now; the choice criteria would be "fit with the 
data." Elegance and analtyic solvability of models are de-emphasized.  
  There are, of course, limits to what we can discover through simulations, and 
there is much methodological work to be done before the complexity approach becomes 
one that can be generally used. But the complexity vision is that this is the important 
work, and that, as computing costs continue to fall, analytic solutions in mathematics will 
be less and less important. Similarly in econometrics; Monte Carlo and bootstrap 
methods will replace analytic methods of testing in many cases.  
  Because the complexity approach involves even more focus on mathematics and 
statistics than does standard economics, the complexity method may seem even less 
compatible with many of the heterodox approaches and with the study of the history of 
thought than is mainstream economics. That, however, is only partly true. Low cost of 
computing lowers the value of theories. The complexity approach demotes theory to a 
lower level and replaces it with conjectures and patterns that temporarily fit. Determining 
whether these patterns are meaningful requires a knowledge of history and of the history Complexity and the History of Economic Thought 
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of economics. Whereas in standard economics the latest theory includes the best of the 
past, in complexity economics patterns can fluctuate and a variety of theories will be 
constantly tested. In complexity economics one is not searching out the truth; one is 
simply searching for a statistical fit that can be temporarily useful in our understanding of 
the economy. If these fits become good, then we can develop a law, but, because of the 
way dynamic equations work, the laws can change, and they can change suddenly. One 
period may be quite different than the period before, and, instead, be much more related 
to a much earlier period. 
Conventional Histories of Economic Thought 
  Conventional histories of science are stories of how thinking progressed from 
informal stories and verbal metaphors that capture aspects of reality to more formal 
structural models. For example, a standard history of physics might go as follows: Kepler 
discovered informally that planets follow elliptical orbits around the sun, but did not 
formalize his understanding. Newton compressed Kepler’s understanding of the 
astronomical data into an inverse square law. Newton’s compression was supplemented 
and extended by Einstein’s theory and models which reduced the relationship of energy 
and mass to E=mc
2. Each of these laws and models is an example of structural simplicity. 
It is formal and reducible into a simple equation or set of equations. 
   Just as conventional economics follows standard science, so too conventional 
histories of economic thought tell the story of how economists have formalized Adam 
Smith’s informal understanding of how competition guides people to serve the common 
good. Most conventional histories agree that economics is not as far along as is physics, 
but they see the search for a more formal simple structural model as the right one, and 
present the history of economics accordingly. Thus, they see the formalization of supply 
and demand; production functions, general equilibrium theory, national income 
accounting, and the concepts of capital and labor as structural simplifications that have 
marked progress in economics.  
  A two-paragraph conventional history of economic thought written for the 
layperson would go as follows: It all began with Adam Smith’s insight of the invisible 
hand. Classical economics (Ricardo and Mill are usually highlighted) developed that 
insight, attempting to derive an acceptable theory of value based on all costs, or on labor 
alone. It failed in that attempt, but in the process developed the seeds of many ideas that 
were later expanded by NeoClassical economists. NeoClassical economics differs from 
Classical economics in that it stopped looking for value only on the cost side, and 
developed a supply/demand theory of value in which both supply and demand 
considerations together determined value (Marshall and Walras are usually highlighted). 
Although this supply/demand approach was developed by a variety of economists, 
Walras’ contribution is seen as providing the beginnings of the most general theory--that 
of general equilibrium.  
  In the 1930s Keynes developed an alternative macro theory, but by the 1990s that 
had fallen by the wayside. Modern economics (Hicks and Samuelson are usually 
highlighted) has developed general equilibrium theory and in 1954 that development 
reached its apex in the Arrow/Debreu theory of general equilibrium. Since then, general Complexity and the History of Economic Thought 
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equilibrium theory has been further simplified, and expanded upon. It has incorporated 
many variations, but it remains the centerpiece of modern economists’ understanding of 
the world. Along the way to this understanding, there have been many side roads 
followed, (Malthus, Marx, Robinson, Hayek, Veblen, and Keynes are often mentioned 
briefly) but these are primarily detours; the centerpiece of economic theory is general 
equilibrium theory.  
  How one tells the above story depends on the methodological approach one takes 
to economics. Relativist historians of economic thought, who see economics as reflecting 
the problems of the time, see little development of a grand theory; they emphasize the 
side roads, arguing that there is no overall thread of development in thinking. Absolutist 
historians, sometimes called Whig historians, see economics as conventional science; 
they tell the story emphasizing the main lines of development and give much less shrift to 
the side roads. But, within conventional economics, the trunk is still there. It is a story of 
the search for simplicity in structure as found in general equilibrium theory.  
A Complexity Perspective on the History of Economic Thought 
  The complexity perspective provides a different pattern to be placed on the 
history of economic thought. It specifically does not accept that the gains from simplicity 
of structure have been worth the costs in terms of what we have lost in our informal 
knowledge. It sees an economics that has found a simple structure, but only at the cost of 
assumptions that make the theory difficult, if not impossible, to relate to empirical reality. 
Important elements of economic processes--path dependency, increasing returns, multiple 
equilibria, and technology are downplayed, and the importance of institutional structure 
is almost lost. The complexity approach to economics is trying to remedy that. It sees the 
economy as a complex system that follows the same laws as all complex systems. 
Complexity theory developed spontaneously, in a search for the laws of complex 
dynamics. The hope is that insight into large complex systems will come from the study 
of iterative processes involving non-linear dynamics.  
  The advantage of seeing economics as the result of such iterative processes is that 
it allows a more direct inclusion of increasing returns and institutions than does the 
standard approach. Complexity theory differs from conventional theory in that it holds 
that the complexity of the economy precludes the far-sighted rationality assumed of 
individuals in conventional theory. If the economy is truly complex, then individuals 
cannot rationally deal with every part of it, making any model based on full global 
rationality inconsistent with the complex structure of the model. People will develop 
institutions to deal with the world, and these institutions will change their behavior. Thus 
the data reduction program in economics cannot be held together by a general 
equilibrium system that assumes far-sighted rationality.  
  Where the complexity approach challenges conventional economics most is in its 
explanation of macro phenomena. In a highly complex system, the connection between 
micro and macro that economics has been searching for cannot be discovered. With this 
view the complexity approach calls into question the entire line of general equilibrium 
research that is the centerpiece of standard economics.  Complexity and the History of Economic Thought 
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  The complexity interpretation of the history of economic theory is different from 
the standard heterodox interpretation of the history of thought for a number of reasons. 
First, the complexity interpretation fits better in the absolutist approach than in the 
relativist approach that most heterodox economics takes. By that I mean that the 
complexity approach sees economics as having a grand theory, and sees the purpose of 
economic science as finding that theory. It differs from the standard histories in that it 
sees multiple potential patterns of simplification, but it is, in many ways, an absolutist 
history with a twist. It sees conventional economics as having followed a reasonable, but 
ultimately wrong, path in its search for simplicity of structure as the central trunk of the 
story. Instead, it suggests that there is another trunk, which finds simplification in 
dynamics, not in static structure. 
  Second, the complexity approach also takes a much more sympathetic view of the 
earlier development of standard economics than do most heterodox approaches to the 
history of economics. The reason is that, until recently, the high-powered computers and 
mathematics to explore the alternative complexity simplification path did not exist, so the 
complexity approach was not viable. What makes it viable now is the development of 
computer technology that has so increased our ability to get numerical solutions to 
complicated non-linear equations, and to see the implications of iterative processes 
involving non-linear equations, that it changes the way it is reasonable to look for 
patterns in data. The point is often made with the “12-cent Ferrari” example. Had the 
same degree of increases in technology occurred in the automobile industry as has 
occurred in the computer industry, automobiles would be essentially free and a Ferrari 
would cost 12 cents. That would change our transportation pattern; shouldn’t the change 
in computer technology also change our research pattern? 
  Before advances in computers made dealing with more complex systems possible, 
it was only reasonable to explore the alternative structural simplicity path. Thus, from a 
complexity perspective many economists may have had a complexity perspective, but 
they did not follow up on it in their formal work because they did not have the tools to do 
so. Numerous examples can be given. Consider Joseph Schumpeter’s discussion of 
multiple equilibria. He writes:  
Multiple equilibria are not necessarily useless, but from the standpoint 
of any exact science the existence of a uniquely determined 
equilibrium is, of course, of the utmost importance, even if proof has 
to be purchased at the price of very restrictive assumptions; without 
any possibility of proving the existence of (a) uniquely determined 
equilibrium—or at all events, of a small number of possible 
equilibria—at however high a level of abstraction, a field of 
phenomena is really a chaos that is not under analytical control. (1954) 
John Hicks had a similar understanding of the problem. He writes that serious 
consideration of increasing returns could lead to the “wreckage of the greater part of 
general equilibrium theory.” (1946, p. 84) My point is that many earlier economists 
understood the implications of complexity, of which increasing returns and multiple 
equilibria are important elements, but they also recognized that they did not have the 
tools to deal with it formally, and therefore did not work on such issues. The role of Complexity and the History of Economic Thought 
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Kenneth Arrow, one of the economists who made a major contribution to general 
equilibrium theory, but who also was central in establishing the Santa Fe Institute that 
has explored complexity within economics, is another example.  
  Any history of thought told from a complexity perspective must also recognize 
that while conventional economics used general equilibrium theory as its core organizing 
feature, much of the development of applied economics was not dependent on general 
equilibrium theory. Other avenues developed, including much work that considered 
increasing returns, and much of the complexity work will build on that work. It is not the 
standard practice of economics, but the formal general equilibrium centerpiece of 
economics, that complexity challenges.  
Conventional Wisdom and Our Intellectual Predecessors 
  Now that I have given a general discussion of how switching to a complexity 
perspective changes the way we view economics, let me consider how previous writers 
fare in the changed perspective. I consider the issue in three separate sections. First, I 
consider general schools of economics; next I consider some economists who would 
move up or down in my rankings. Finally, I briefly discuss two individuals who, from our 
current standpoint, are relegated to footnotes, but who would enter into the panoply from 
a complexity perspective. I should make it clear that the discussion is a "reporter's 
treatment" of the field, not a specialist's treatment.  
Assessment of Schools of Thought 
  In the standard history of economics text, the mainstream, or NeoClassical, school 
is given primary focus, but students are introduced to various other schools including the 
German historical school, the Austrian school, American Institutionalists, and the radical-
Marxian school. The general views of each of these schools is presented, and contrasted 
with the mainstream development from Classical to NeoClassical to modern.  
  In a history of thought told from a complexity perspective, the story told about 
these heterodox schools would be much the same as is currently told, but told a bit more 
sympathetically. Many of the heterodox objections to standard economics would be 
presented as precursors of the modern complexity school’s objections: The German 
historical school opposed the equilibrium method, believing instead that history mattered, 
and that different periods could be unique; the Institutionalists opposed NeoClassical 
theory as too simple; Austrians saw the market mechanism as an example of spontaneous 
order, again providing a precursor to the complexity focus on emergent order; radicals 
saw that there was more than a single way of looking at the economy. 
  The above argument deals with the presentation. But the assessment of these 
heterodox schools of thought would not significantly change. Although one can find 
many areas where the schools were precursors of complexity work, complexity 
economics did not develop from these schools. Complexity economics developed out of 
standard economics, and is best seen as a natural evolution—the economics field 
responding to the changing technology. The complexity approach shares with standard 
economics a focus on formal mathematics and maintaining a formal scientific approach. Complexity and the History of Economic Thought 
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Most modern institutionalists argue against the use of formal mathematics, radicals 
replaced a NeoClassical ideological bias with an alternative bias, claiming that bias was 
inherent in science; Austrians relied on deduction to the almost total exclusion of 
induction; and the German historical school was anti-formalist in almost all the forms.2 
Thus, in my view, none of these schools would have led to complexity economics. They 
would have likely led standard economics elsewhere. Thus, from a complexity 
perspective, these heterodox schools are seen in roughly the same light that they are seen 
now by sympathetic interpreters--as schools that had some of the important insights, but 
which were ahead of their time.  
Assessment of Individual Economists 
  While the assessment of schools may not change much, the assessment of 
individual economists will. The following table provides my fast and dirty overview of 
selected economists’ change in rankings when they are considered within a complexity 
framework. The discussion below the table gives a brief justification for that assessment.  
 










Adam Smith  
  Smith goes up in the rankings because of his recognition of the problems of 
complexity, his emphasis on increasing returns, and his vent for surplus argument, all of 
which can be seen as leading to ideas that are consistent with the complexity perspective. 
In the conventional texts Smith is presented as “the father of economics”--the person who 
codified economic thinking—but he is also presented as a fuzzy thinker whose informal 
reasoning allowed many inconsistencies. He had a variety of theories of value, a confused 
presentation of the price level, and unclear policy prescriptions. Later Classical 
economists had to clarify these. From the complexity perspective, Smith is still 
inconsistent, but there is good reason for that inconsistency since the mathematical 
techniques had not yet developed to handle the issues that he recognized were important. 
His emphasis on vent for surplus, increasing returns, and the need for a broader setting 
for economics fits well with the complexity vision, as does his unclear policy 
                                                 
2The schools did not necessarily start that way, and it can be argued convincingly that early heterodox 
economists were simply waiting for the right mathematics to come along. But there seems to be a path 
dependency argument. Arguing against current mathematical approaches attracts followers who oppose 
math, and thus these heterodox schools did not attract the individuals who developed complexity theory.  Complexity and the History of Economic Thought 
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prescriptions--the complexity approach to economics does not lead to definitive policy 
prescriptions.  
Thomas Malthus 
  Malthus stays neutral in the ranking, but it is a neutrality that results from his 
rising in one dimension and falling in another. He rises because of his work on 
population; Malthus saw that the interesting issue in understanding economics was in 
iterative processes. His ideas on population were central in the development of Darwin’s 
ideas, which has a close tie-in with the complexity perspective. He falls in the rankings 
because the dynamic process that he emphasized was one that focused on diminishing 
returns. He did not allow for the development of ongoing endogenous growth. He further 
falls in the ranking because his macro argument that general gluts were possible fails to 
use any of the insights of complexity, and thus helped reinforce the view that if one 
approaches the macro economy logically, there can be no unemployment.  
David Ricardo 
  Ricardo is seen in many ways as the hero in the structural simplicity vision; he 
took Smith’s ambiguous ideas and formalized them into economic laws. The standard 
history of thought emphasizes how his theory of comparative advantage is one of the 
greatest developments in economics. It is also generally acknowledged that he developed 
the labor theory of value as far as it could be developed (the 93 percent labor theory) and 
clarified the argument for trade. With his theory of rent, he was a precursor of the 
NeoClassical marginal productivity theory.  
  In part Ricardo falls because, with his current high ranking, there is nowhere to go 
but down. While his formalization helped make Smith’s ideas specific, that same 
formalization led economists to the focus on structural simplicity, and took away the 
emphasis found in Smith on increasing returns. Ricardo's search for value within a unique 
equilibrium system made the theory simpler than it otherwise would have been and 
directed economic researchers away from taking seriously the complexity of the 
economy.  
John Stuart Mill 
  Mill is generally presented as the mature Classical economist who had little to 
add to formal Classical thought. He made a few contributions: He pulled Classical 
economics towards a humanist mode; he led Classical economics away from the wages 
fund theory; and he drew a distinction between the social laws of distribution and the 
technical laws of production. With these insights he moved away from the labor theory of 
value, but he did not abandon it. In the standard view, he receives high ranking, but not at 
Ricardo’s level. From the complexity perspective, Mill’s ranking increases. His focus on 
social laws of distribution was an important development in recognizing the complexity 
of the economy. He recognized that social and economic phenomena couldn’t be divided. 
He saw the importance of path dependency in a way that Ricardo did not. His nervous 
breakdown can be seen as a natural reaction of an individual's trying to fit the complex 
world into too simple a structure.  Complexity and the History of Economic Thought 
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Karl Marx 
Marx is generally presented as a Classical economist who did not share the 
mainstream ideological views. He turned the labor theory of value into a theory of 
exploitation, and, in doing so, showed some deeper problems with it. He focused on 
increasing returns, the tendency of economies to grow, and how distribution was tied into 
that growth process.  
Marx’s ranking improves from a complexity perspective not only because of his 
formal analysis, but also because of his informal analysis of class, and his emphasis that 
individuals' rationality is shaped by the social situation around them. His failure to see 
social relations evolving to maintain stability in the economy still limits his being 
considered a precursor of complexity economics. 
Léon Walras 
The standard view of Walras is that he led economics into general equilibrium 
theory as well as that he developed marginalism. He receives high marks for both. In the 
complexity perspective, since general equilibrium and marginalism fall in the ranking, it 
is not surprising that Walras also falls. Walras directed economics into a particular 
mathematical structure that did not fit.  
Alfred Marshall 
In the standard history Marshall receives a positive, but subdued, treatment. He 
played a key role in introducing supply and demand concepts, but he simultaneously 
failed to formalize theory. Thus he is often accused of following the “zigzag windings of 
the flowery path of literature," and his work is characterized by Paul Samuelson as 
having “paralyzed the best brains in the Anglo-Saxon branch of our profession for three 
decades.”3 In his Principles of Economics Marshall struggled with how to include both 
the Classical focus on dynamics and growth--which called for explicit treatment of 
increasing returns--and the NeoClassical focus on diminishing marginal returns in the 
production of goods.  
As Marshall typically did when faced with conflicts, he used what might be called 
"the Marshallian Straddle" to circumvent them. He discussed each but never integrated 
them. Still, his stature rises somewhat relative to Walras because the reason he refused to 
formalize was precisely that his perception of the economy was that it was complex, and 
that the tools were not up to formalizing the insights; he recognized the limitations that 
Walras did not. He rejected any simple specification of general equilibrium and in Note 
21 in Principles argued that the true foundation of aggregate economics was to be found 
in thermodynamics, an idea that clearly places him in the complexity perspective.  
Frederick Hayek 
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  Hayek usually receives only a short mention in the standard history of thought, in 
part because he lived until the 1980s and his work was continually evolving, and, in part, 
because he did not fit the standard mold. Starting in the 1940s with his publication of 
Abuse of Reason (1940) Hayek’s work was evolving outside of the Austrian tradition of 
Ludwig von Mises. As it did, it better fits a complexity tradition. In his vision, Hayek 
came very close to the modern definition of complexity; however, he did not conduct any 
deeper empirical or analytic research into the field of complexity. 
  Hayek understood the nature of complex phenomena and correctly associated 
them with the economy. His emphasis on spontaneous organization has complexity 
written all over it, as does his focus on prices as storing systemic information that 
individuals did not have and could not compute. In his Nobel address in 1974 he 
developed the arguments in his earlier work and argues that the reductionist approach of 
economics, which is mimicking that of the pure sciences, is inapplicable to economics 
since economics studies phenomena of “essential complexity, i.e. with structures whose 
characteristic properties can be exhibited only by models made up of relatively large 
numbers of variables." (Hayek, 1989, p. 4) In the same address Hayek also recognizes 
that “organized complexity” is dependent on the “manner in which the individual 
elements are connected with each other” at least as much as the individual properties of 
the agents in the system. Thus, Hayek, especially, in his later writings, will significantly 
move up in the rankings.  
John Maynard Keynes 
  Keynes stays neutral in the rankings in large part because he currently gets such 
high ratings. His questioning of econometrics, his emphasis on the nonergodicity of the 
economy, and his work on probability all can be seen as a positive from a complexity 
perspective. But, in policy, he never shied away from the simple static models that were 
developed to capture his views, and never made clear that his analysis rested on a 
complexity perspective, even though he had opportunities to do so. Thus, the foundations 
of his General Theory were ambiguous, and, despite many possibilities in which he could 
have laid its foundations in complexity, he did not do so. His primary interest in policy 
took him away from theoretical issues, and his willingness to accept standard theory, if it 
arrived at the policy result he wanted, leave him unchanged in my rankings.  
Two Economists who Move from Footnotes to the Main Text  
  In this final section I consider two economists, Charles Babbage and John von 
Neumann, who seldom show up prominently in standard histories of economic thought, 
but who have a significant place in a history told from a complexity perspective. As 
Nathan Rosenberg (2000) nicely points out, Babbage applied complexity reasoning to the 
economy as he expanded Smith's ideas to the industrial age. He emphasized nonlinear 
costs and thought of the economy within a complexity perspective. Had economics 
focused on his work rather than Ricardo's its history likely would have been quite 
different.  
  Unlike Babbage, who is hardly ever mentioned at all in histories of economic 
thought, John von Neumann frequently gets a short section in history of economics texts Complexity and the History of Economic Thought 
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for his work on game theory. That work, however, is not what earns the main focus from 
a complexity perspective. Instead, it is his work on self-replicating systems. That work, 
which is a precursor to work in artificial intelligence, and is related to the development of 
the computer, is central in the development of the complexity perspective, and places von 
Neumann as a pivotal figure in any history of economic thought told from a complexity 
perspective.  
  The importance of John von Neumann to economics should come as no surprise. 
He is already considered by many to be one of the most brilliant minds of the twentieth 
century. He contributed significantly to numerous branches of science, including 
mathematics, quantum mechanics, and computer science. In standard economics he is 
known for his development of game theory, which pushes the analytic approach to 
economics as far as it can be pushed. But it is not game theory that would be emphasized 
in a complexity history of thought; it is his work on self-replicating systems, where he 
developed the logic of what was necessary. Specifically he specified the minimum 
requirements needed for self-replicating systems in his theory of automata. That theory is 
an important cornerstone in complexity theory, and is particularly useful in trying to 
understand and simulate artificial life, which is central for understanding and simulating 
iterative processes.  
  An automaton is a general-purpose universal machine which can execute the 
instructions of any algorithm. There are natural automata, such as the nervous system, 
and artificial ones, such as computers. Von Neumann argued that, similarly to natural 
living systems, artificial systems should also be able to reproduce themselves. He 
imagined a machine floating on the surface of a lake, where a lot of machine parts float 
as well. Following instructions, the machine—a universal constructor—assembles 
another machine. It can reproduce itself if it has a blueprint of itself within itself. 
Reproducing automata are description copiers—they include a blueprint of each machine 
they construct within it. The "genetic" information of the machine is thus both interpreted 
as an algorithm to be followed, and as genetic material copied uninterpreted, as a piece of 
the machine being copied.4 That work is far from standard economics but it lies at the 
heart of complexity theory. 
Conclusion 
  This quick and dirty overview of the history of thought is delivered from a 
complexity perspective. In many ways the most interesting part of the story is its relation 
to heterodox economics, many of whose practitioners have had something close to a 
complexity vision. But the complexity approach did not develop from heterodox 
economics. The line of descent is through standard economics. The complexity approach 
developed from the standard approach to economics for two reasons. The first is the 
limitations and problems with the standard approach; it simply did not provide a 
meaningful model of the aggregate economy. But that failure was not enough to cause the 
mainstream of economics to abandon the approach, and those who did became known as 
heterodox economists. What was necessary for the mainstream of economics to consider 
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the complexity vision was the second reason, a change in research technology, primarily 
the computer, which allowed economists to study dynamic systems that previously were 
beyond analytic study.  
  The methodology of complexity economics is quite consistent with the 
methodology of standard economics and, as such, does not fit well with many heterodox 
traditions. Still, many heterodox economists have had a complexity vision, and thus 
complexity economics can be seen as a melding of heterodox vision with standard 
scientific methods, which is only now coming of age. 
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